The preamble to the “Middle East Peace Framework” begins with a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict: The UN General Assembly rejected the Middle East peace framework because the agreement was reached without the participation of the United Nations and the PLO and was not in accordance with the Palestinian right to return, self-determination, independence and national sovereignty. In December 1978, it stated in Resolution 33/28 A that the agreements are valid only if they are within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and resolutions, that they include the Palestinian right to return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and that they are concluded with the participation of the PLO. The passive attitude of the Security Council has also been criticized.  On 6 December 1979, the United Nations, in its resolution 34/70, condemned all partial agreements and separate treaties that did not respect Palestinian rights and comprehensive solutions for peace; It condemned the continuation of the occupation of Israel and called for the withdrawal of all occupied territories.  On 12 December, in Resolution 34/65 B, it rejected more specific parts of the Camp David agreements and similar agreements that did not meet the above requirements. All these partial agreements and separate treaties have been strongly condemned. The part of the Camp David agreements on the future of Palestine and all similar agreements have been cancelled.  The exploratory meetings of Mr. Carter and Foreign Minister Cyrus Vance, gave a fundamental plan to revive the peace process on the basis of a Geneva peace conference and presented three main objectives for Arab-Israeli peace: the Arab recognition of Israel`s right to peace, the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories won during the six-day war by negotiations with neighbouring Arab nations, in order to ensure that Israel`s security is not compromised and that a Jerusalem without sharing is assured.  The move came from the fervour of NATO countries to obtain assistance to improve Egypt`s troubled economy, the belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on those of the Arab world, and on the hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and its other Arab neighbours and help solve the Palestinian problem.
Prime Minister Begin`s reaction to Sadat`s initiative, even if sadat or Carter had not hoped, showed a willingness to engage the Egyptian head of state. Like Sadat, Begin saw many reasons why bilateral discussions would be in his country`s best interest. It would give Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt, rather than with a larger Arab delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands.